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The in~plementation of a nuclear waste management technology 
raises several issues concerning the regulation of social risk. The most 
basic of those issues are how to regulate a technology when the uncer- 
tainties in social consequences are important, and how to incorporate the 
relevant social values in the regulations. This paper presents a decision 
analytic approach to resolving these issues, based on the development of 
radiological risk evaluation indices. While it is essentially a case study, 
describing work carried out for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
this case is used to discuss the more general issues involved. 
We begin by discussing the need for risk evaluation to provide a clear 
and defensible basis for regulating technologies involving social risk. We 
then present an overview of the problem of evaluating the risk of nuclear 
waste management, and an overview of our approach. That is followed by 
a development of risk evaluation indices for the regulation of nuclear 
waste management. The indices developed are expected utilities, based 
on preferences elicited from groups of people. The use of the indices 
developed is illustrated in a hypothetical example. Finally, components 
of the analysis requiring further development are identified and dis- 
cussed, and the usefulness of the methodology evaluated. 
Running head: Evaluation of Nuclear Waste Risk. 

DECISION ANALrSlS FOR THE EVALUATION 
OF RISK IN NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEXENT 
John W. Lathrop, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria, 
Stephen R. Watson, Emmanuel College, Cambridge, U.K.* 
Over the  past two decades or so there has been increasing concern 
over the use of many modern technologies. While much of this concern 
results from the demonstrable and existing deleterious side effects of 
these technologies (for example, the effect on animal and plant life of pol- 
lution from many chemical plants, or the cumulative effects in the food 
chain of insecticides like DDT), there are some technologies tor which the 
cause for concern is potential rather than actual (for example the deple- 
tion of the ozone layer by chlorofluorocarbons and by the exhaust gases 
of supersonic transports, or potential radiation releases from buried 
nuclear wastes). Governments are concerned to control both kinds of 
technological side-effects, but the appropriate regulatory action is much 
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more difficult to determine in the latter case, where there is considerable 
uncertainty about the possible nature of the consequences of the technol- 
ogy, and where they can occur in the distant future. 
In t h s  paper we discuss how the paradigm of decision analysis might 
be used to establish an index whch can evaluate the risk associated with 
activities of the latter kind; in particular we shall exemplify our sugges- 
tions throughout by reference to the problem of regulating nuclear waste 
management. At the outset we ought to stress that we are not using 'risk' 
in the sense normally used in decision analysis. In bringing together deci- 
sion analysis and risk evaluation, we must adopt terms that clearly distin- 
guish concepts often confused between the two fields. In particular, 'risk' 
will be used to describe the potential for deleterious consequences associ- 
ated with a technology, while 'uncertainty' will be used to describe the 
lack of information available concerning what the impacts of a technology 
might be. 
The need for risks to be analyzed if they are to be adequately 
managed is beginning to be widely recognised. The important studies by 
1 Rowe and ~owrance' on the nature and management of risk have been 
followed by a collection of papers outlining research needs and opportuni- 
ties in this area, edited by ~ a t e s ~ .  Our goal in t h s  paper is to add to the 
emerging literature of this discipline by describing a particular approach 
to risk assessment, usmg decision analysis. This is a controversial area; 
for example, the criticisms by ~ o v i n s ~  and cochran5 of the decision 
analysis of alternatives for electricity generation carried out by Barrager 
e t  a16, are paralleled by Hoos' attack7 on the use of risk analysis for 
nuclear waste management and the critical comments of Tocher 8 
concerning the use of ' ?cision analytic concepts in any social planning 
activity. These authors give many detailed arguments against particular 
quantitative methods; the reader is urged to consult them as an antidote 
to overconfidence in the methods of systems analysis, and decision 
analysis in particular. However, it is fair to say that most of their criti- 
cisms are destructive in nature and often might easily be paralleled by 
similar criticisms of alternative informal and traditional methods of deci- 
sion making and regulation setting. It is our strong belief that if used 
properly, the quantitative methods of decision analysis, whlle subject to 
some valid criticism, improve decision making in that they provide a con- 
sistent base for analysis and improve communication. In many cases the 
informal methods share all the flaws of the formal approach; it is just that 
their very informality obscures the fact that these flaws exist. 
In the next Section we give an overview of the problem and the 
approach we take. That is followed by the kernel of our paper, where we 
describe in detail a decision analytic approach to the evaluation of risk 
and how this method was used to construct risk evaluation indices for the 
regulation of nuclear waste management. The next section describes the 
results of our work in terms of a hypothetical example, which also serves 
to illustrate the role of the approach in the development of regulations. 
We then discuss some of the findings and the aspects of our approach 
which especially warrant further development. Finally, the last section 
briefly comments on the present and potential usefulness of the 
approach. This work was carried out for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) under the direction of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. 
10 Larger reports (Lathrop  atson son and Campbell ) contain more detailed 
descriptions of the project and the results of the study. 
oWXWEW: THE PROBLEM AND THE APPROACH 
Before going on to discuss our work, we will briefly describe the 
nuclear waste management problem, characterize some special aspects 
involved in evaluating the risk of waste management strategies, and out- 
line our approach. 
Several activities involving nuclear material (electric power genera- 
tion, weapons manufacture, medical treatment, e tc.) produce radioactive 
waste. Some of the waste will remain hghly radioactive for tens of 
thousands of years. A large stock of such wastes has already accumu- 
lated and more is being generated every day. In the U.S. the existing 
stock of hghly radioactive waste is currently being held in temporary 
storage until a strategy for long-term disposal is established. The stra- 
tegies currently being considered all involve the treatment and packaging 
of waste into forms designed to minimize leakage, then the burial of those 
forms in deep, geologically stable repositories. The transport, storage, 
and packaging of waste expose members of the current generation to 
radiation: low level routine exposures and a risk of accidental high-level 
exposures. In addition, even with the safest repository design there is a 
positive probability that radioactive isotopes will leak out and enter the 
water supplies and food chains of future generations, adding. to their low- 
level radiation exposure. Whle there is a great deal of uncertainty con- 
cerning the effects of low-level radiation, such radiation could result in 
additional cancers, mutations, and cases of impaired fertility in future 
generations. In regulating nuclear waste management, then, the NRC 
controls both the overall level of risk and how that risk is distributed 
between current and future generations. 
It can be seen from this description that there are four basic aspects 
that characterize the problem of evaluating waste management risks. 
First, nuclear waste management involves actions conducted now that 
effectively commit society to scenarios with probabilities of human health 
impacts over centuries. Thus many people may be affected that are not 
yet born. Second, the health impacts are best described on several dif- 
ferent dimensions: there are several types of health effects, and they 
may be incurred by nuclear waste workers or people outside the industry 
in each of many generations. Thlrd, a great deal of uncertainty is 
involved in assessing those impacts: in the ability of the waste manage- 
ment system to contain the wastes, in the effects of the extremely low- 
level radiation most apt to result from any release, and in the doses actu- 
ally received (Who knows where people will live, in what densities, with 
what diets, in 10,000 years?). Fourth, whlle several agencies and com- 
panies are to be involved in nuclear waste management, risk management 
can be considered to be centered in one agency: the NRC. 
The four aspects just listed characterize a situation where a quanti- 
tative approach to risk measurement would be valuable. In particular, 
the complexity of evaluating multidimensional and uncertain outcomes 
that affect people not yet born is a strong argument for the use of quanti- 
tative, as opposed to informal, risk measurement in support of risk 
management decisions. Quantitative approaches to risk measurement 
have quite a long history. (See ~arrner".  starr12 and the bibliography of 
Clark and Van ~ o r n l ~ . )  Broadly speaking, they have all recognized that a 
measure of risk should be an increasing function of the probabilities of 
deleterious consequences, and the severity of those consequences. A 
measure often chosen has been expected fatalities. Shortcomings of this 
criterion include its inability to cope with attitudes toward uncertainty 
(Who feels that a 50-50 chance of two deaths is just as bad as one certain 
fatality?), and the exclusion from consideration of consequences other 
than death (which in the case of radiation exposure includes effects as 
significant as genetic mutations). Papp et all4 recognized this inade- 
quacy and suggested that it should be rectified by using utility theory; 
the present paper describes how we have followed this suggestion for 
nuclear waste management. 
While our decision analytic approach to risk measurement is 
described in more detail later, its essential concepts are presented in a 
brief overview now, both to orient the reader for the rest of the discussion 
and to provide a framework for defending this approach against the main 
points of its critics. Very briefly put, the approach consists of developing 
a multidimensional utility function over the health-effect consequences of 
a nuclear waste management system, separately assessing a probability 
distribution over those consequences for each alternative system, and 
then calculatmg the risk index for each system as its expected utility. 
Because our utility function increases with the severity of negative conse- 
quences (contrary to convention), the risk index is an increasing function 
of probability and severity of consequences, as desired. As explained by 
~ o w a r d . ' ~  the expected utility represents preferences for uncertain out- 
comes on a cardinal scale, ranlung complex alternatives in a manner con- 
sistent with preferences revealed in comparisons of simple alternatives. 
We adopted the particular form of multidimensional utility function 
developed by Howard.'' That function consists of a multidimensional 
value function to represent value trade-offs between the various dimen- 
sions under certainty, then a von Neumann-Morgenstern utihty function 
on that value function to represent attitude toward uncertainty. In clas- 
sic decision analysis applications, the function is fitted to the preferences 
of the decision maker by means of an elicitation protocol. The protocol 
consists of a series of simple paired comparisons (Whlch do you prefer, A 
or B?) designed to reveal the decision maker's value trade-offs and atti- 
tude toward uncertainty. The essential idea of the approach is to fit the 
utility function to simple comparisons, e.g., where the alternatives differ 
on only two dimensions, where the decision maker's responses are apt to 
reflect his actual preferences. The utility function can then be used to 
make very difficult comparisons among alternatives with complex and 
uncertain outcomes in a manner consistent with the responses to the 
simple comparisons. In this application, however, there was no single 
person whose values were to be represented. Since the NRC was in some 
sense the decision maker, we decided to develop a methodology to 
represent the values of four groups of people the NRC could choose to be 
responsive to. Those groups are described later. Rather than attempt to 
aggregate values over the four groups, values were aggregated into a sin- 
gle utility function within each group, so that four separate risk evalua- 
tion indices were developed. 
Now that the broad outlines of our approach have been presented, it 
is useful to examine them in light of the chef criticisms often raised 
against utility approaches. A useful compendium of criticisms is found in 
a paper by ÿ ocher'. where he raises three key points often raised by oth- 
ers. His first criticism is that utility methods force N-dimensional alterna- 
tives onto a single-dimension scale via value trade-offs elicited by posing 
hypothetical choices to individuals. Our answer to  this point is simply 
that any method to evaluate the risk of waste management systems must 
have the same shortcomings, though such problems are apt to be con- 
cealed in the unexplicated parts of less formal methods. Any comparison 
of the risks of alternative systems must effectively project those risks 
onto some single, common scale if anything is to  be said along the lines 
of: System A presents more risk than System B. Granted, there are prob- 
lems with any use of index numbers to evaluate multi-dimensional 
phenomena, whether those indices are IQ, GNP,  or risk. Information must 
be lost on the way from N dimensions to  one dimension. Yet the fact 
remains that the NRC is charged with managing something called risk. It 
is our conviction that effective risk management requires some single- 
dimension definition of risk readily understandable to the NRC, the people 
it is to regulate, and the people it is to protect. The value trade-offs 
within that definition must be hypothetical, because decisions concerning 
projected waste management systems involve choices among sets of 
effects that have never occurred before. 
Tocher's second criticism is that the axioms of utility theory serve to 
represent individuals as mechanistic beings without free will. 'Jlus point 
is only peripherally related to the waste management case, since utility 
theory is used in t h s  case to represent preference, not p redc t  behavior. 
Clearly, some determinism of preference must be assumed if individuals' 
values are to be incorporated into choices among current actions with 
long-term impacts. Tocher's third point concerns the difficulty of aggre- 
gating values. This difficulty was mitigated in the methodology reported 
here by limiting aggregation to withln groups where some homogeneity of 
values was expected. In delivering four different risk evaluation indices 
to the NRC, based on the values of four disparate groups, the critical 
value aggregation problem was left to the political processes of the NRC. 
DEVELOPMENT OF A RISK EXALUATION INDEX 
Whle the basic ideas of the decision analytic approach adopted here 
are relatively straightforward, there are several steps in its implementa- 
tion. We shall now describe those steps as we encountered them in our 
development of a risk index, some of the problems each step entailed, 
and how we dealt with them. 
Consequence Scope 
In constructing a utility function describing consequences, we first 
had to specify the important possible consequences of a nuclear waste 
repository. The most significant possible effects are, clearly, health 
effects on humans, but there are many others, such as effects on animal 
and plant life, restrictions of civil liberties and restrictions on land use. 
We made a modeling decision a t  this stage to limit attention to health 
effects on humans. This limits, of course, the use to which our risk index 
can be put, since in comparing repositories any of the other possible 
consequences may be of sigmficance. However, the purpose of this study 
was not to analyze specific decisions on the location and design of reposi- 
tories, let alone whether or not radioactive waste should be generated; it 
had the lesser, but still important goal of providing a measurirg device 
for only one aspect of the waste management problem, namely the health 
risk to humans. Here is an example of the methods of decision analysis 
contributing to public policy formation by analyzing part of the problem. 
In our experience, such partial analyses are much more likely to be used 
and useful than any attempt to bring the whole decision making process 
for an  issue of public policy under the hammer of hard analytic methods. 
Value Source 
The idea of using decision analysis on public policy issues is, of 
course, not new. Both ~oward' '  and ~ d w a r d s l ~  have proposed schemes 
for social decision analysis. One of the problems which such schemes 
raise, however, is the determination of whose values should be 
represented in the utility function. In an evaluation of the risk in waste 
management it would seem desirable somehow to reflect public values; 
but these may differ importantly from person to person--how may such 
differences be combined into one index? It should be helpful here to find 
some method of aggregating individual utility functions to create a group 
utility function. While there are  difficulties in specifying such a pro- 
cedure (as seaver17, p 14, observes. "no entirely satisfactory method for 
devising group utilities exists4'), the work of Keeney and ~irkwoodl '  cites 
theoretical support for the idea of using a welghted sum of utility func- 
tions as a group utility function, the weights to be determined by a 
"benevolent dictator" or an "honest broker". At the same time, the  
weights given to people with markedly different stands on a policy issue 
represent trade-offs perhaps best made In the course of the political pro- 
cess, not in the risk analysis. 
The relevant political process in this case centers on the NRC, whch  
is effectively charged with balancing the political interests of any conflict- 
ing parties. There is always reason to suspect that any regulatory agency 
is subject to disproportionate pressure from the industry it is supposed 
to monitor, so that  such an  agency may not be an  ideal umpire of con- 
7 fhcting interests (see, e.g., Hoos ). However, the goal of the approach 
described here is not to reform the political process, but simply to 
develop a risk evaluation methodology that incorporates social values into 
the existing political process. Consequently, we drew the bounds between 
the evaluation and the process it is to serve, and decided to represent 
separately the values for four groups, described below. The groups 
chosen were ones to which the NRC is responsive, which span the political 
spectrum of interests faced by the NRC, and withn which values could be 
expected to be relatively homogenous. Whle t h s  strategy avoids aggre- 
gating values across conflicting groups of people, values must still be 
aggregated across individuals within each homogenous group to arrive a t  
a group utility function. That aggregation is explained later.  
In the study, 58 people were interviewed and utility functions elicited 
from each of them. They were divided into groups as follows: 
a .  NationalAdvisors(13respondents) 
T h s  group consisted of persons who had the ear  of the Federal 
policy-makers in that  they either served on nuclear waste 
advisory bodies, or their views were published or otherwise con- 
sulted by Government policy-makers. 
b. Concerned Citizens (33 respondents) 
The intent in this case was to select citizens who were a t  least 
somewhat abreast of social issues and who were concerned that 
Government actions should reflect the general public interest. 
c .  Nuclear Power Opponents (7 respondents) 
These were persons who were known publicly to oppose further 
development of nuclear power, a t  least until safety problems 
have been resolved. 
d. Nuclear Power Advocates (5 respondents) 
These were persons who had been identified as advocates of the 
further development of nuclear power. Some of the respondents 
in t h s  group maintained that they did not consider themselves 
as advocates of nuclear power. 
Group utility functions for each of these four groups were calculated as 
weighted sums of the individual utility functions. Then these were com- 
bined with example probability distributions describing different reposi- 
tories, producing four distinct risk evaluation indices for each repository. 
We re turn  to the results of these calculations later. Because of our deci- 
sion to  elicit utility functions from so many people, it was necessary to  
construct a simple standard form for the utility functions, which called 
for several approximations in the following steps. 
Consequences 
One of the basic problems of approximation concerned how to 
describe health effects. The first widely used and definitive discussion on 
the health effects of radiation is the 1972 report of the U.S. National 
Academy of Sciences Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ion- 
izing ~adiation" (the BEIR report). It is apparent from this and other 
20 documents (see ICRP #26 ) that the health consequences of radiation 
exposure are many and varied. Despite this, there is a fairly obvious 
categorization, as portrayed in Figure 1. The first distinction is between 
'stochastic' and 'non-stochastic' effects. To quote ICRP #26 20, p.2: 
"Stochastic effects are those for which the probability of an 
effect occurring, rather than its severity, is regarded as a func- 
tion of dose, without threshold.' Non-stochastic effects are those 
for which the severity of the effect varies with the dose, and for 
which a threshold may therefore occur." 
Stochastic effects can be further categorized as either somatic, if 
they become manifest in the exposed individual himself, or genetic, if 
they affect his descendants. It is clear that withln each category there is 
a very large number of possible effects. The modeling decision that now 
faced us was how many of these to include in a list of attributes for a util- 
ity function. Here a balance had to be drawn, as always in applied decision 
analysis, between analytic simplicity and completeness. We needed to 
find a set of attributes which included everything important in the evalua- 
tion of risk, and yet was small enough for a utility function over the attri- 
butes to be elicited reasonably easily from a large number of people in a 
Figure 1. Categorization of  health effects. 
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short time. We selected the following five variables, as indicated in Figure 
x1 - Number of fatal cancers 
xZ - Number of nonfatal cancers 
x3 - Number of mutations 
x4 - Number of acute fatalities 
x5 - Number of cases of impaired fertility 
Acute fatalities here refers to those that occur shortly after exposure, 
and so correspond to incidents of very high dose associated with pre-seal 
accidents. 
Several approximations and assumptions about the respondents' 
value structure are implied by the above list. First, the use of the total 
number of cases of a particular kind implies that any such case is as bad 
as any other such case. Second, there are other known radiation effects 
which do not appear on the list, such as cataracts or retarded develop- 
ment in children. Tlurd, some of these categories cover a very wide class 
and in order to enable trade-offs between such effects to be accessible 
psychologically to our respondents, it was necessary to particularize 
them considerably; thus the class of mutations was represented by a 
mentally sub-normal person, who needs some extra care throughout his 
life. Ths  last approximation will only be good if this case 1s an approxi- 
mate certainty equivalent of the class of all possible mutations; this in 
turn depends upon the nature of the probability distributions with whch 
the utility function will be used, and we had to complete this study 
without a good idea of those probabilities. 
We are not satisfied that t h s  list of attributes is the best set to 
describe health effects, and we feel that  more work should be done on 
determining a good set.  However, this seems to us a reasonable first 
attempt, and does satisfy some of the criteria for choosing attributes: 
sufficient complexity to cover the important structure of the problem, 
yet sufficient simplicity for elicitations of the trade-offs to be believable 
and available in a reasonably short period of time. 
The next point concerns the circumstances in which the radiation 
doses arise. As Fischhoff e t  a12' discovered, the circumstances of risks 
do affect their importance as judged by members of the public. Of the 
many possible circumstances, the two we judged to  be significant enough 
to include explicitly in the utility function were whether or not the risk 
was undertaken as part  of a person's occupation, and the time a t  which 
the radiation dose might arise. Figure 2 illustrates this categorization. 
Notice that  occupational risk can only be suffered by workers in the  
current generation, since after sealing no further operation of the reposi- 
tory will be necessary. 
We define an  index i to indicate the  circumstances of the dose giving 
rise to a particular health effect according to the following scheme: 
i = 1: Effects due to occupational exposure before sealing. 
i = 2: Effects due to nonoccupational 
exposure, to the current generation. 
i = 3: Effects caused by a dose in the two thousand years following 
repository sealing. 
= 4: Effects caused by a dose more than two thousand 
years following repository sealing. 
Figure 2. Categorization o f  the circumstances of  rad ia t ion  exposure. 
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Each of the five health effects can occur as a result of circumstances in 
each of the four categories above. There are, therefore, twenty variables 
zij which describe the possible effects caused by a nuclear waste reposi- 
tory, where i = 1 ,..., 4 indicates the cause of the dose and j = 1 ,..., 5 
indexes the type of health effects (e.g., z 3 ~  is the total number of nonfatal 
cancers arising from doses received from the nuclear waste in the two 
thousand years after the repository has been sealed). Note that the time 
division here is somewhat coarse. Once again, a balance had to be struck 
between capturing the essential elements of the respondents' value struc- 
tures and keeping the model reasonably simple. 
Individual Utility Functions 
The next problem was to establish a parametric structure for the 
utility function of each individual. We chose to construct first a value 
function v k )  (where z is the vector whose twenty components are zi j ) .  
which would have the property that any possible set of health effects z 
judged to be equivalent to or worse than any other y would have 
v k)rv (y). The form we adopted was 
'lks form makes some rather sweeping assumptions about prefer- 
ence structures. First, the linearity implies that, for example, if one 
extra acute fatality is as bad as two extra mutations at one level of all the 
variables, the same is true at  all other levels of the variables. Second, the 
fact that the constant coefficient of each variable zij is a product aipj 
implies that trade-offs among health effects do not depend on the 
circumstances of the dose, and trade-offs between the same effects in dif- 
ferent circumstances do not depend on which health effect is considered 
(i.e., if three acute fatalities in a thousand years time is as bad as two 
acute fatalities now, then three fatal cancers in a thousand years time is 
as bad as two fatal cancers now). Although these assumptions are fairly 
strong, our respondents' preference structures seemed to be consistent 
with them to an adequate approximation. 
The final stage in the construction of a von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility function for each of our respondents was to reflect uncertainty 
preference (our synonym for the more usual 'risk preference,' which we 
shall avoid to prevent confusion with the more general use of the word 
'risk' in thls paper). We constructed a single-argument utility function 
reflecting uncertainty preference, whose argument was v k ) .  In our 
detailed reports9110 we used an exponential family of utility functions. 
which has the advantage of being a single- parameter family. T h s  proved 
to be an inadequately rich family to describe the uncertainty preferences 
of many of our respondents, a t  least as they, were assessed in this study. 
In a re-analysis of our work, a two-parameter family of utility functions 
would be desirable. 
Note that t h s  utility function incorporates a very straightforward 
solution to a central problem with risk evaluation of nuclear waste 
management: how much relative weight to give health effects to future 
generations as opposed to health ef'fects to the current generation. Whle 
this characterization of the problem puts it in the obscure language of 
evaluation, it can be given much more meaning in terms of a decision 
dilemma: for the money remaining in your limited budget, you can save 
(expectationally) either 10 lives in the current generation, or 11 lives 
1,000 years from now. Which do you choose? There are a set of argu- 
ments for discounting future health effects. reviewed in ~ o o d i n ~ ~ .  whch 
would lead one to prefer saving 10 current lives over 11 future lives. How- 
ever, as Goodin points out, the economic opportunity-cost arguments for 
discounting do not reably apply to the long time periods involved in 
nuclear waste management, since an appropriate rate of return on 
resources saved is extremely difficult to estimate, even in the form of a 
subjective probability distribution. Goodin goes on to describe and attack 
various other rationales for discounting. The strength of our approach is 
that it does not presume any particular prescriptive rationale. It simply 
asks respondents, in the trade-off format explained above, for their rela- 
tive weights between current and future health effects. A respondent is 
free to take a stand that future health effects should be weighted equally 
to current ones, or to ascribe to a discounting rationale and set his or her 
own rate of discount (positive or negative). If there were a clear con- 
sensus from a broad community of experts as to some correct, non- 
intuitive approach to relative evaluations of health effects over time, our 
value elicitation could be attacked. But clearly, as Goodin's article 
attests, there is no such consensus, so it could be argued that our 
respondent's answers to this particular trade-off question represent as 
good a basis for setting policy as conflicting expert opinions. 
Value Elicitation 
Having developed the structure of the utility function, the values of 
the parameters had to be elicited from each individual respondent. One 
of our team sought out and interviewed 58 respondents (as described 
above) and made estimates of the parameters la]  and t/3{ for each person 
interviewed. He did this by first asking the respondent to order the five 
health effects as to seriousness, and then mahng pairwise comparisons. 
For example, if the respondent stated that a fatal cancer was worse than 
an acute fatality, he was asked how many acute fatalities was as bad as 
one fatal cancer. By such comparisons and associated cross-checks the 
parameters I@{  were estimated. Similar comparisons, only thrs time for a 
particular health effect, but with different underlying causes, gave rise to 
estimates for the parameters la] .  Finally, lottery type questions were 
asked of the respondents, from which their uncertainty preference was 
assessed. 
Because of time limitations it was only possible to spend an hour or 
so with each respondent. Given the known effects of expressed value 
changing over time and depending on the type of questions asked (the 
2 3 problem of labile values, Fischhoff et  a1 ), we have considerable doubts 
as to whether our results would have been the same if a longer time had 
been taken in eliciting values. 
Value Aggregation Withn Groups 
The next step in the calculation of risk indices for each of the four 
groups mentioned above was the determination of the weights to apply to 
the utility function of each individual witbn each group to obtain the 
group utility function as a weighted sum. As mentioned before, according 
to Keeney and ~ i r k u o o d ' ~ ,  and Keeney and ~ a i f f a ~ * ,  p.539. one reason- 
able approach to determine the weights in an additive group utility func- 
tion is to use the judgments of a "benevolent dictator" or "supra 
decision-maker," who makes a fair balance between the intensities of 
preference of the group members. Ths  would seem a particularly 
appropriate approach in this case, since the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission has the responsibility of regulating the nuclear industry in 
the U.S. in the balance of the public interest. One could ask the Commis- 
sioners themselves to determine relative wegghts between individuals 
within each group. The nature of our study, however, precluded us 
approaching the Commissioners. We had to resort, therefore, to a pro- 
cedure for determining weights based on the concept of equal weighting 
of calibrated utility functions. 
The process of calibrating individual utility functions consists of 
weighting each function so that a utde on one is in some sense compar- 
able to or commensurate with a utile on another. Even this limited 
operation involves interpersonal comparisons of utility, and so has no 
fully satisfactory methodology. Our approach was to standardize the util- 
ity functions on a unit interval: one fatal cancer caused by a pre-seal 
nonoccupational low dose. This standard was chosen because it was the 
most clearly understood health effect, so that the effect of differing indi- 
vidual interpretations of a health effect on calibration error was minim- 
ized. In addition, this standard involved the dose circumstance generally 
used as a basis by the respondents against which other dose 
circumstances were discounted, so that the effect of differing discounts' 
on calibration error was minimized. 
Probability Distributions 
Now that we had constructed four utility functions over the twenty- 
component health effects vector z, each derived from different groups of 
people, we could combine these utility functions with probability distribu- 
tions over z describing the uncertainty in the consequences from any 
particular repository. Here we faced a further problem. Although the 
theory of subjective probability implies that probability distributions can 
be constructed describing any degree of uncertainty, the implication of 
the methods of social decision analysis suggested by ~ o w a r d ' ~  and 
~dwards" is that the best available expertise should be harnessed to 
construct probability distributions on the outcomes of alternative reposi- 
tories. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory was at  the time of t h s  study 
engaged in an extensive project to produce the necessary expert 
knowledge of the likely consequences of any particular repository site 
and design, but the appropriate results were not available a t  the time our 
were completed. Instead, in order to test the implications of 
our utility functions, we elicited example subjective probability distribu- 
tions from two staff members at  Lawrence Livermore Laboratory who had 
considerable personal experience in the assessment of radiation hazards, 
and in the possible consequences of geological disposal of radioactive 
waste. They produced probability distributions for two hypothetical repo- 
sitories, differing from each other in a way that was meant to represent 
the effects of a hypothetical regulation requiring an increased amount of 
waste packaging. It was hypothesized that the regulation would increase 
the probability of pre-seal health effects sllghtly (due to increased han- 
dling), and decrease the probability of post-seal health effects (due to 
increased isolation). It should be emphasized that these probability dis- 
tributions are for example purposes only, and are in no way based on the 
results of the physical repository modeling effort conducted at  Lawrence 
Livermore Laboratory. 
The results of our work fall into two categories: features of the eli- 
cited values and characteristics of the risk evaluation index itself, as gen- 
erated from the assessed preferences of the four respondent groups and 
applied to the example probability distributions mentioned above. 
Elicited Values 
The two most interesting features of the elicited values happen to 
coincide with the two main improvements of expected utility over 
expected fatalities as a risk measure: the representation of attitudes 
toward uncertainty and the evaluation of more dimensions of health 
impacts than fatalities alone. Concerning attitudes toward uncertainty, 
half of the respondents were uncertainty preferring (i.e., risk seeking) in 
that they preferred a one percent chance of 100 fatal cancers over one 
fatal cancer for certain. About one quarter of the respondents were 
uncertainty averse, one quarter uncertainty neutral. In every one of the 
panels, taken separately, less than half of the panel members were 
uncertainty averse. These preferences indicate that a group utility func- 
tion that assumes individual uncertainty attitudes to be neutral would 
match or overstate the aversion to uncertainty of about three-quarters of 
the respondents. Because the risk evaluation index is intended to meas- 
ure the risk of repositories relative to the risk of standards involving less 
uncertainty, and because any errors in the estimates of repository 
22 impacts are apt to understate their uncertainty (see Goodin ), an index 
based on a group utility function that overstates aversion to uncertainty 
could be considered desirably conservative. For these reasons, and 
because of several advantages for implementation of an uncertainty neu- 
tral group utility function, that form of function was adopted for the risk 
index calculations performed in this study. 
Concerning evaluation of health impacts other than fatalities, value 
trade-offs between fatal and nonf'atal health effects were such that nonfa- 
tal health effects contributed significantly to the risk evaluation index. 
As one example, more than half of the respondents considered a mutation 
as worse than or equivalent to a fatal cancer. 
Characteristics of the Index 
The clearest way to present the risk index, and the implications for 
that index of the elicited values, is to demonstrate its use. The following 
paragraphs will step through a few simple example calculations to that 
end. The calculations are oriented toward answering three basic ques- 
tions: does the proposed regulation decrease overall risk, by how much is 
the overall risk decreased, and does the regulation decrease the risk to 
an acceptable level. 
The most elemental question these risk evaluation indices can help 
to answer is: Does the proposed regulation decrease overall risk? For a 
regulation requiring increased packaging of wastes, for example, the 
answer is not immediately clear, since it would decrease post-seal risk a t  
some expense in increased pre-seal risk. The risk indices (expected utili- 
ties) calculated according to the scheme outlined in the previous section 
are given in Table I ,  for repositories with and without the regulation, for 
each of the four respondent groups. Since we adopted an uncertainty 
neutral (linear) form for the group utility functions, and because of the 
particular normalizations we used, the numbers in Table I are not only 
expected utilities; they are also equivalent pre-seal nonoccupational fatal 
cancers. As the colupln differences in Table I make clear, the example 
regulation does in fact increase overall safety for each respondent group. 
TABLE I 
Expected U t i l  i ti es o f  Four Respondent Groups f o r  two Repositories 
Repository National Concerned Nuc 1 ear Nuclear 
Advisors Ci t izens Opponents - Advocates 
repository A,  
without new 2.4 9.1 
regulat ion 
repository B ,  
with  new 2.0 7.3 4.2 .41 
regulat ion 
Differences in index value between groups can be explained in terms 
of preference differences in discounting of future health effects and in the 
relative importance of different health effects. However, there is no 
direct operational significance of the differences within rows in Table I .  All 
that matters as far as regulation selection is concerned are the 
diflerences within columns. This is because utility measures only have 
significance for actual choices faced by some decision making process, 
based on a single assessed set of values. The actual choice faced here is 
between repositories A and B, using the values of each of the four groups, 
respectively. A comparison of, say, the National Advisors' utility for A and 
the Concerned Citizens' utility for A is meaningless: there is no actual 
choice between A and A, and there is no single set of values involved. A 
discussion below compares the utilities of the different groups in a more 
meaningful way by presenting implications of differences in utilities for 
determinations of acceptable risk. 
There is one basic concept perhaps not stressed enough in this 
report that Table I helps make clear. The differences in numbers withn 
either row of the Table should not be interpreted as measurement error. 
We have not constructed a single risk evaluation index, but a set of four 
such indices, each capturing, in some way, the attitudes of one of the four 
panels. The risk evaluation index of a repository is not some physical 
attribute of that repository; rather, it is an evaluation of the impacts of 
that repository, as judged from a particular set of personal values. 
The second basic question the risk evaluation index can help to 
answer is: How effective is the proposed regulation? Table I1 presents 
three different ways to scale the &fference in risk evaluated between 
repository A (without the regulation) and repository B (with the regula- 
tion). These differences are measure$ of the effectiveness of the pro- 
posed regulation. The first row of Table I1 is simply the set  of differences 
between rows from Table I: the reduction of risk in utiles caused by the 
regulation. Because of the scaling used, those utiles are equivalent pre- 
seal nonoccupational fatal cancers prevented by the regulation, and so 
are measures of the equivalent lives saved by the regulation, for a very 
particular type of life saving. The utility functions used here are linear, 
so each function is basically a set of coemcients between arguments. It is 
an easy matter, then, to convert any difference in utiles (as in Row I) into 
any set  of utility function arguments (health effects), and then convert to 
the dose that would produce that  se t  of health effects, using the dose 
effectiveness coemcients of the BEIR ~ e ~ o r t l '  used throughout this 
study. Two sets of results of such conversions are displayed in Rows 2 and 
3 of Table 11, equivalent reductions in occupational dose and pre-seal 
nonoccupational dose, respectively. The Logic of the utility function is 
such that for any column in Table I1 the dose reduction in Row 2 would 
cause the risk evaluation index reduction in Row I, as would the dose 
reduction in  Row 3. Another way to put it is for any group (column in 
Table II), the dose reduction in Row 2 would be worth just as much as the 
dose reduction in Row 3 or the reduction in the number of fatal cancers 
in Row 1. Of course, the utility functions differ between groups, so the 
ratios between entries in Table I1 vary from column to column. 
TABLE I1 
Measures o f  Risk Reduction due t o  the Proposed Regulation 
Measure o f  Risk Reduction, National Concerned Nuclear Nuclear 
Dif ference i n  Equivalent: Advisors Ci t izens Opponents Advocates 
. . .pre-seal non-occupational 
f a t a l  cancers -44 1.8 -96 -05 
... occupational dose (man-rem) 12,000 34,000 14,000 3,000 
. . .pre-seal nonoccupational 
dose (man-rein) 5,300 19,000 8,800 800 
The second and third rows of Table I1 can be useful for comparing the 
effectiveness of a regulation with other regulations or technical alterna- 
tives on convenient dimensions. For example, if an alternative regulation 
to the one used in the example would have the sole effect of reducing 
occupational dose, Row 2 would offer a very direct comparative measure. 
The effectiveness of the regulation could be measured in terms of 
reduction in expected fatalities, a very different measure from a reduc- 
tion in equivalent fatal cancers. For the hypothetical probability distribu- 
tions used in t h s  example, the reduction in expected fatalities due to the 
regulation comes to .23 expected lives saved. It is interesting to compare 
this Agure with the first row of Table 11. For every group except Nuclear 
Advocates, the fact that the reduction in equivalent fatal cancers incor- 
porates nonfatal health effects leads to measures of regulation 
effectiveness more than twice as large as the less comprehensive 
"expected lives saved" measure. On the other hand, the fact that the 
Table I1 - Row 1 measure incorporates the Nuclear Advocates' discount 
factors for future and occupational fatalities leads to a measure of regu- 
lation effectiveness much smaller than the undiscounted "expected lives 
saved" measure. These examples should make clear that the "expected 
Lives saved" measure is not at  all "value-free." It in fact makes specific 
assumptions concerning value trade-offs that seem to be importantly at 
variance with the value trade-offs assessed from our respondent groups. 
The third basic question the risk evaluation index can help to answer 
is: Does the regulation reduce the risk of the repository to an acceptable 
level? The d e h t i o n  of acceptable risk is quite involved and will not be 
9 10 addressed here (see Lathrop and Watson and Campbell ). But whatever 
the definition of acceptable risk, the risk evaluation index can play a key 
role in its determination by providing a common scale on which to com- 
pare risks, and on which to set an acceptable risk limit. For example, 
suppose some analysis finds that a repository is acceptable if its risk is 
less than the risk due to an occupational population dose of 65,000 man- 
rem (maximum individual dose less than 5 rem). For any given risk 
evaluation index, this dose can be expressed in utiles as a limit on that 
index scale. Any repository can be evaluated using the risk evaluation 
index on the same utile scale, and so directly compared with the accept- 
able risk limit. Of course the risk evaluation index depends on the values 
represented, so such an acceptable risk limit provides yet another way to 
explore the implications of hfferences in values between our four groups. 
In our case the risk evaluation index is simply a weighted sum of four 
expected doses (occupational, nonoccupational in each of three periods), 
with different weights for dlfPerent groups. Those differences in weights 
mean that any given acceptable risk limit may lead to different relative 
positions of the limit and the evaluated repositories for the different 
groups. For example the 65,000 man-rem limit mentioned above was 
selected solely because it leads to corresponding index values for the 
National Advisors and Nuclear Opponents groups such that repository A is 
unacceptable and repository B is acceptable. In other words, based on 
the 65,000 man-rem limit and the values of those two groups, the pro- 
posed regulation reduces the risk from an unacceptable to an acceptable 
level. However, the Nuclear Advocates discount the future health effects 
of the repositories so much that the risk evaluation indices of reposi- 
tories A and B both come out below the index value of the same 65,000 
man-rem current dose limit. At the same time the Concerned Citizens 
weight future health effects so bghly that their risk evaluation indicies 
for both repositories come out above the index value of the 65,000 man- 
rem current dose limit. That is, using the same basis for an acceptable 
risk limit, the Nuclear Advocates' values are such that both repositories 
are acceptable, while the Concerned Citizens' values are such that both 
9 repositories are unacceptable. Lathrop describes these calculations in 
more detail, and presents other example acceptable risk limits, including 
one based on comparison of the repository risk with risk allowed by an 
existing regulation. 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of t h s  paper has been to describe an attempt to use the 
techniques of decision'analysis to establish risk indices for nuclear waste 
repositories whch reflect public values. The novel aspect of our approach, 
which we have not noticed reported elsewhere, has been the creation of 
utility functions representing segments of public opinion by first con- 
structing utility functions for a sizeable number of individual respondents 
and then combining them to form group utility functions. One problem of 
this approach was that difficulties in eliciting values from so many 
respondents required us to make rather more approximations in the 
methodology than would normally be necessary in a study of t h s  kind. 
The two primary elicitation results call for some discussion. First, 
the small fraction of uncertainty averse respondents suggests that if a 
risk evaluation index is to reflect the popularly observed aversion to 
catastrophe, it must represent that feature in some other way than the 
uncertainty aversion of utility theory. Second, the large weight given to 
nonfatal health effects in our study demonstrates the importance of a 
risk evaluation index comprehensive enough to include them. 
Several interesting results came out of this research and are 
presented above. However, the most valuable results are the three very 
general aspects of risk evaluation that our approach has made clear by 
example. First, risk is not some physical quality of a physical system; it 
is a function of both the physical system and the group of people evaluat- 
ing the risk. Second, there is no value-free measure of risk; even the 
commonly used expected fatalities measure assumes particular values. 
Third, whle our methodology defines a scale on which to set an  accept- 
able risk limit, that  scale is so value-dependent that the relative positions 
of repositories and the acceptable risk limit can change as a function of 
the group whose values are  represented. 
To lay the foundation for our conclusions, it would be helpful now to  
review and summarize the  main aspects of our approach that require 
further development. 
a.  Qroup u t i l i t y  funct ions 
We have already mentioned that there is no firmly established 
methodology for deriving a group utility function by some combination of 
individual utility functions. Even if we allow the notion of a group utility 
function because of its intuitive reasonableness, a combination of indivi- 
dual utility functions is not  the  only way t o  acheve it;  we could, for exam- 
ple, determine the utility function by group discussion and argument to  
produce unanimity about its structure. Despite this, the theoretical 
background discussed by Keeney and ~irkwood'' supports our approach 
as a reasonable one. The actual determination of the weights that  we 
have used here to  calculate the group utility functions leaves a lot to be 
desired, however. Were the NRC to  use this approach, more research 
would be needed t o  determine more defensible weights to apply to  the 
different individuals in each group. 
b .  S t r u c t u r e  of utility f u n c t i o n s  
There were several assumptions made in the construction of the indi- 
vidual u t h t y  functions that  should be more thoroughly tested and, if 
necessary, relaxed, in a more extensive revision of this study. First we 
assumed that our restricted list of twenty health effects would be a rich 
enough basis for the utility function adequately to capture the relevant 
public values. Second, we assumed that the trade-offs between effects 
were constant, and, moreover, that trade-offs among consequences of a 
dose did not depend upon the circumstances in which the dose arose, and 
vice versa. 
c .  Elici tat ion methodology  
Because of the large number of respondents from whom we elicited 
utility functions, it was necessary to spend only an hour or so with each 
person. It would have been desirable to  spend much longer (say two days) 
with each of our subjects, but this was impossible not only because of the 
limited time available to us, but also because our respondents were busy 
people themselves. Given the d~fficulty of the issues we were asking peo- 
ple to address (who has thought about how much worse it is for a cancer 
to occur in the next 30 years than 10,000 years from now?), and the 
recognized difficulty in 'Knowing What You the utility functions 
we assessed should be regarded as first approximations only. 
d .  Probabil i ty  model ing 
It is vital for the application of this approach to risk evaluation that 
the probabilities should be sound in some intuitive sense. The probabili- 
ties used in the example presented above were for example purposes 
only, and require much improvement. The construction of probabilities 
in this area is exceedingly difficult and contentious. Even in the much 
'harder' area of reactor risk analysis, where the final probabilities of 
failure depend to a large extent on known system design and failure rates 
of individual system components, for whch extensive failure data is 
known, an attempt to determine the probabilities of failure met with con- 
tention (see the Rasmussen reportz5, and its various critiques 26.27) 
However, much of the criticism of that attempt was that it appeared to 
give an objective answer to the question of how likely a reactor accident 
would be. It is our view that probability is only a measure of degree of 
belief, and it is clear that in determining probabilities of radioactive 
release in tens of thousands of years time there must be a large measure 
of subjectivity, albeit based on available expert knowledge. We believe 
that it is possible to obtain adequate probabilistic descriptions of the 
consequences of a radioactive waste repository, but the necessary combi- 
nation of the judgments of different experts (in material science, geology, 
demography and biology) has yet to be made. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the further development required in the areas of our 
methodology outlined above, we must pose the question: Can we recom- 
mend that the NRC use the risk evaluation methodology described here to 
form a basis for the regulation of nuclear waste management, or are the 
problems so great that this whole approach to risk evaluation should be 
abandoned? Our answer is a positive recommendation to apply our 
methodology, but only after further development. It is clear, because of 
the difaculty of the problems outlined above, that considerable further 
work needs to be done before we can be confident that the risk evaluation 
indices created adequately represent the relevant social values, and pro- 
vide a satisfactory means for incorporating those values into the risk 
management process. As challenging as those problems are ,  the fact 
remains that  risk must be evaluated before it can be managed, and we 
feel that the risk evaluation methodology described here is an  improve- 
ment over the less explicit process of risk evaluation that would probably 
be used in its stead. Whle the value elicitation questions called for in our 
approach were very difficult to answer, the fact remains that  those ques- 
tions must be answered in the course of nuclear waste risk management, 
either explicitly with a methodology such as the one described here, or  
implicitly without any formal analysis. All our methodology does is force 
people to  confront these difficult trade-offs directly, rather than leave 
them to be determined implicitly by a process that manages rlsk without 
defining it. 
Note that  the methodology presented here is not intended t o  depoli- 
ticize what is clearly a political process. The determination of a n  accept- 
able level of risk is left entirely to the political domain. All that  is sug- 
gested here is a measuring rod, so that  the political debate surrounding 
the regulation of social risk is a t  least clarified to the extent that there is 
a clearer idea of what risk is. Even more than that ,  the concepts of risk 
proposed here are  not normative in nature, but are  based on social values 
elicited from groups of people to  which the regulatory agency is normally 
responsive. As several people have pointed out (see for example Otway e t  
2 8 a1 ) other issues, such as centralization of power, may be at stake in pol- 
itical debates ostensibly concerned with technological risk. But if risk is 
more clearly defined, then those other issues will be  brought more clearly 
into focus, instead of being obscured in ill-defined notions of social risk. 
On the basic argument that an improvement in the present level of 
information about public values concerning risk is necessary for the 
proper regulation of nuclear waste management, we maintain that our 
approach is worth pursuing. At the very least, it will provide a rational 
basis for proposed regulations put forward by the staff of the NRC at the 
start of the long chain of review. But beyond that, we believe that as 
society presses more toward democratic involvement in the regulatory 
process, the methodology presented here will become more and more 
attractive as a fair and just means to reflect social values in regulatory' 
decisionmaking. 
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